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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the decision of the District Court, First Judicial District, Kootenai 
County, Hon. Charles Hosack presiding, concerning just compensation owed in a partial 
condemnation action by the State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") and an award of 
costs and discretionary fees to ITD. 
(i) Nature of the case. 
This dispute arises out of a condemnation action brought by the Plaintiff, ITD to acquire 
and condemn 16.314 acres of property owned by H.J. Grathol ("Grathol") located at the 
intersection of State Highway 54 and U.S. 95 in Kootenai County. Grathol sought just 
compensation based on the fair market value of the part taken and severance damages accruing 
to the remainder of its property. ITD claimed no severance damages and sought a determination 
of the fair market value of the take only. A five day court trial was held with the District Court 
Judge Charles Hosack, presiding. 
On May 25, 2012, the District Court entered a Decision and Judgment awarding Grathol 
$675,000 for just compensation, awarding zero severance damages. The District Court denied 
ITD's request for attorney fees but found ITD to be a prevailing party and awarded costs as a 
matter of right and discretionary costs in the amount of $24,298.56. Grathol appeals the Court's 
Judgment of the amount of just compensation and the award of costs and discretionary costs to 
ITD. ITD appeals the District Court's denial of its attorney fees. 
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(ii) Course of the proceedings below and its disposition. 
On November 17, 2010, ITD filed a Complaint seeking to condemn a 16.314 acre portion of 
Grathol's property. (Docket No. 38511, R Vol. I, pp. 1-18.) On December 21, 2010, ITD moved for 
early possession of the property. Grathol opposed ITD' s motion, in part, because the Complaint 
failed to acknowledge that Grathol' s property would also be impacted by the planned extension of a 
frontage road through it. On December 23, 2010, Grathol filed its Answer. (Docket No. 38511, R. 
Vol. I, pp. 77-81.) On January 21, 2011 the District Court held a hearing on ITD's motion for early 
possession and granted ITD's request finding inter alia that ITD was not condemning Sylvan Road 
(the frontage road) across the Grathol property.1 On April 5, 2011, a Court Trial was scheduled with 
Hon. Lansing Haynes. (R, p. 5.) On October 27, 2011, the case was transferred to Hon. Charles 
Hosack for trial. (R., at 6.) 
On January 6, 2012, ITD filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in Limine 
seeking to "dismiss" certain damages allegedly asserted by Grathol, including damages related to 
Sylvan Road and seeking to prevent Grathol's appraiser Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood ("Sherwood") 
from testifying as to his opinion of the "larger parcel" based on the highest and best use of portion 
of Grathol's parent tract, but less than the whole. (R., pp. 305-570.) Grathol responded (R, pp. 
578-647) and a hearing was held on February 2, 2012. (Tr. 2/2/12, Vols. I, IL) 
On February 3, 2012, the District Court partially granted ITD's motion for summary 
judgment on damages related to construction delay, lost profits, gravel and taking of Sylvan 
Road. (R., pp. 715-17). The District Court denied summary judgment on damages related to 
1 On February 1, 2011, Gratholappealed the District Court's Order (Supreme Court Docket No. 38511). 
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visibility, access and impact on Grathol' s development plans. Id. The District Court also ordered 
Grathol to revise its expert witness disclosure. (R., pp. 712-14.) Grathol filed a Supplemental 
Expert Witness Disclosure on February 10, 2012 (R., pp. 720-29) and another hearing was held 
on February 13, 2012. (Tr. 2/13/12.) On February 16, 2012 the District Court granted ITD's 
Motion in Limine barring Grathol' s from presenting "separate claims" for severance damages, 
finding that those damages were subsumed within Grathol's valuations of the difference in the 
fair market value for the remainder parcels before and after the take. (R., pp. 734-37.) 
Trial was held from March 5, 2012 to March 9, 2012. (Tr. 3/5/12 - 3/9/12.) ITD first 
presented witness testimony of Jason Minzghor and appraiser Stanley Moe ("Moe"). Grathol 
presented testimony of engineer James Coleman ("Coleman"), land planner/owner Geoffrey 
Reeslund ("Reeslund"), appraiser Sherwood, and valuation and development testimony from 
Alan Johnson ("Johnson"). On rebuttal, ITD presented further testimony of Moe, as well as from 
land planner George Hedley ("Hedley") and appraiser Lawrence Pynes ("Pynes"). 
At the conclusion of the court trial the District Court requested post-trial briefing. (Tr. 
3/9/12, pp. 1004-13.) On May 25, 2012, the District Court issued its Post-Trial Memorandum 
Decision and Order. (R., pp. 1265-98.) 
On June 18, 2012, ITD filed its Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. (R., pp. 1315-.1469.) 
Grathol timely objected to ITD's Motion. (R., pp. 1482-1562). On July 13, 2012, Grathol filed its 
Notice of Appeal currently before this Court. (R. pp. 1563-67.) On August 29, 2012, the District 
Court heard ITD's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, denying ITD attorney fees but awarding 
costs as a matter of right and partially awarding discretionary costs of $11,000 for Pynes' "rebuttal" 
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appraisal. (Tr. 8/29/12.) On September 10, 2012, the District Court entered an Order and a Final 
Judgment on costs and attorney fees. (R, pp. 1611-15.) 
(iii) Concise statement of the facts. 
The Grathol property is a (mostly) vacant rectangular shaped 56.8 acres of property 
consisting of three separate parcels. It is located at the northeast comer of the intersection of US 95 
and Highway 54 in Athol, Idaho. (Ex., p. 30.) 
ITD condemned 16.314 acres along the western boundary of the Grathol property for a 
realignment of US 95 and an elevated interchange with on and off-ramps. The realignment 
bifurcates the west half of the Grathol Property leaving remnant parcels on both sides of the "new" 
US 95 alignment (Tr. 3/5/12, pp. 51-55, Ex., p. 16.) After the take, the remaining total acr~age will 
be 40.49 acres. (Tr. 3/5/12, p. 57, 11. 1-7.) The speed limit on the "new'' highway alignment will 
increase :from45 mph to 65 mph after construction is complete. (Tr. 3/5/12, p. 52, 11. 4-18.) 
Prior to filing the condemnation action, on July 17, 2010, ITD made an offer to purchase 
the portion of condemned land and produced a copy of an appraisal by Moe. (R pp. 1523-24, Ex., 
pp. 34-141.) Moe's appraisal valued the 16.314 acres being taken at $571,000. (Ex., pp. 43-46.) 
Grathol declined the offer. On December 15, 2011, ITD submitted an ("Acarrequi") offer of 
settlement in the amount of $1,100,000. (R p. 1543.) Grathol presented a counter offer which 
was rejected. (R. pp. 1549-52.) 
At trial, Moe testified in accordance with his appraisal. He stated that the remainder 
would not be subject to any severance damages or special benefits as a result of the take. (Ex., 
pp. 45-46.) Moe arrived at his figure for just compensation based on an opinion that the property 
taken was worth $35,000 per acre ($.80 a square foot). (Tr. 3/5/12, pp. 96-97, 11. 11-25, 1-3., p. 98, 
11. 17-24.) Moe stated that the highest and best use of the property as eventual commercial 
development land had not changed as a result of the take and the residual property left after the take 
would not be impacted. (Tr. 3/5/12, p. 97, 11. 12-22.) 
Moe considered the entire 56.8 acres of Grathol's property as the "larger parcel" for his 
analysis. (Tr. 3/5/12, p. 145, 11. 20-24.) Moe testified that the determination of the "larger parcel" is 
a judgment call for an appraiser to make (Tr. 3/6/12, p. 306, 11. 13-17.) Moe also admitted that a 
larger parcel can be a portion of a bigger tract of land, held by one owner. (Tr. 3/6/12, pp. 307-11, p. 
3 21, 11. 5-1 7.) Moe testified that as undeveloped land, the entirety of the property was historically 
under one use, but acknowledged that for the highest and best use analysis, the property's existing 
or historical use was irrelevant. (Tr. 3/5/12, p. 147, ll. 14-18, Tr. 3/6/12, p. 344, ll. 12-18.) Moe 
noted that for development, the property would need utilities, sewer and water and he opined the 
easterly remainder would "support" development of the western half. (Tr. 3/5/12, pp. 148-49.) In 
doing a comparable market analysis Moe focused on 50 acre tracts ofland. (Tr. 3/5/12, pp. 185-86, 
ll. 16-25, 1-2.) Moe recognized that increasing the size of properties decreased the average square 
foot value. (Tr. 3/5/12, p. 189, ll. 15-25.) As part of Moe's adjustments of comparable properties, 
Moe adjusted for size. (Tr. 3/5/12, p. 192, ll. 8-12.) 
Geoff Reeslund, an architect/planner, testified for Grathol. He developed vanous 
preliminary "concept" plans for the Grathol property. (Tr. 3/6/12, pp. 351-52, Ex., pp. 951-61.) 
Reeslund testified ITD's plans changed after the property was acquired. (Tr. 3/6/12, pp. 383-84, 
394-97.) Reeslund testified that ITD's initial project plans depicted Sylvan Road but were amended 
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after ITD decided on a straight alignment of Sylvan Road across the Grathol property. (fr. 3/6/12, 
pp. 395-96, 398-99, Tr. 3/7/12, pp. 428-30.) Reeslund testified about the impacts on development 
plans as a result of ITD 's take including reduced visibility, elimination of a signalized intersection, 
elevation changes for the intersections, and the impacts on traveling customers for business on the 
property. (Tr. 3/6/12, pp. 398-405, Tr. 3/7/12, pp. 431-33.) Reeslund testified that the realignment 
isolated the western-most remainder and was an impediment to extending utilities to all of the 
property. (Tr. 3/7/12, pp. 434-38.) Reeslund estimated that after the new alignment was 
constructed, the costs to connect utilities to the western remaining parcels could be over $1,000,000 
because of the necessity to drill underneath the new highway for utility lines. (Tr. 3/7/12, p. 444, 11. 
2-17.) 
Sherwood is a licensed appraiser who testified at trial in accordance with his appraisal 
report. (Ex., pp. 668-703). Like Moe, Sherwood also undertook a comparative market analysis to 
value the Grathol property. (Tr. 3/7/12, pp. 475-77, 483-84.) Sherwood selected ten comparable 
properties in his valuation some of which were large tracts of commercial development land. (Tr. 
3/7/12, pp. 486-87.) Sherwood testified that the best comparable he analyzed was (No. 7) located 
just off of US 95 in Sagle Idaho. (Tr. 3/7/12, p. 506, 11. 19-21.) The Sagle comparable was very 
similar in size to Sherwood's 30 acre larger parcel. (Tr. 3/7/12, p. 507, 11. 3-9.) The Sagle 
comparable sold for $2.69 per square foot and Sherwood made adjustments downward based on the 
time of the sale. (fr. 3/7/12, pp. 510-11, 11. 14-25, 1-13.) Sherwood described his larger parcel 
analysis and its relevance to determining value. (Tr. 3/7/12, pp. 492-93, 11. 19-25, 1-16.) Sherwood 
considered the larger parcel as being the western 30 acres based, in part, on the size required for 
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typical commercial developments such as the one planned by Grathol. (Tr. 3/7/12, pp. 493-94, 11. 
17-25, 1, p. 498, 11. 3-19.) Sherwood (like Moe) testified that the larger parcel determination resides 
-with the appraiser and can be less than the entire parent tract. (Tr. 3/7/12, p. 494, 11. 2-6.) Sherwood 
stated that the western 30 acres has a different (highest and best) use than the rest of the Grathol 
property. (Tr. 3/7/12, p. 496, 11. 10-20.) He testified that the remainder to the west of the proposed 
Sylvan Road extension would have a separate and distinct use from the remainder lying to the east 
of Sylvan. (Tr. 3/7/12, pp. 496-97, 11. 21-25, 1-20.) Sherwood testified that any Sylvan Road 
extension would physically separate the property and thus eliminate contiguity. (Tr. 3/7/12, pp. 498-
99, 11. 21-25, 1-11.) Sherwood concluded that the value of the west 30 acre larger parcel at the time 
of the taking was $2.25 per square foot making the value of the part taken $1,598,543. (Tr. 3/7/12, 
p. 513, 11. 8-18.) A summary of Sherwood's valuation is contained in Grathol's Supplemental 
Expert Witness disclosure. (Rat 720-29.) Sherwood did not testify to a value of the remaining 26 
acres to the east of Sylvan Road as it was unaffected by the take and had a different prospective use. 
(Tr. 3/7/12, p. 529, 11. 16-22, p. 532, 11. 2-15.) Sherwood testified that his opinion of value for the 
western 30 acres before the take was $2,940,300. He also testified that his opinion of value for the 
remaining property after the take (the remainder of the 30 acre larger parcel, that is) was between 
$1,165,000 and $1,060,000. (Tr. 3/8/12, pp. 635-36, 11. 3-25.) Those values for the western 
remainder when added to the value of the take equaled an amount between $1,775,000 and 
$1,880,000 for just compensation. (Tr. 3/8/12, pp. 635-37, Ex., pp. 676-79.) 
Jim Coleman testified at trial that he had been hired by Grathol to determine the feasibility, 
cost and design of a modular wastewater treatment system for the property. (Tr. 3/8/12, p. 662.) 
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Coleman estimated the amount and characteristics of the wastewater for the property if it were to be 
developed along the lines of the conceptual plans prepared by Reeslund. (fr. 3/8/12, pp. 666, 695-
96.) Coleman testified that the system he recommended had self-contained modules which would 
treat wastewater to "Class A standards" for land application. (Tr. 3/8/12, p. 692.) The wastewater 
could be used for irrigation or in water features and circulated within a commercial development 
(Tr. 3/8/12, pp. 692-93.) Physically the designed system required two underground modules with 
dimensions of eight by forty feet, and a small building to house the controls and components at a 
size of approximately twelve by twenty feet (Tr. 3/8/12, pp. 693-94.) Additional modules could be 
added later to increase the system's capacity. (Tr. 3/8/12, p. 694.) Exhibit 85 contained Coleman's 
summary of the wastewater system. (Ex., pp. 398-99.) Coleman testified that the area needed for 
land application would be between 13 and 16 acres which could be either on or off-site or integrated 
within the development (Tr. 3/8/12, pp. 696-98.) 
Alan Johnson also testified on behalf of Grathol in accordance with his disclosure (R, pp. 
720-29, Ex., pp. 735-36.) He testified that Grathol selected the property based in part on tenant 
interest in a grocery store at that location. (Tr. 3/8/12, p. 776, 11. 4-17, pp. 777-79.) Johnson testified 
that there was interest from a motel tenant as well. (Tr. 3/8/12, pp. 780-81, 11. 23-25, 1-21.) Johnson 
testified that in his opinion the property was "divided" to the east and west of the Sylvan Road 
extension, (Tr. 3/8/12, pp. 785-86.) and that the new highway alignment was a detriment to the 
property based on rate of travel, visibility, the new overpass and the increased costs of utility 
integration. (Tr. 3/9/12, pp. 792-95, 797-99.) Johnson also testified that any extension of Sylvan 
Road would further impact the use of the property. (Tr. 3/9/12, pp. 800-03.) 
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Johnson testified that the value of the western 30 acres was $3.23 per square foot and $1.00 
a square foot for the eastern remainder before the take. (Tr. 3/8/12, p. 785, 11. 4-5.) Johnson's based 
his valuation for the west 30 acres on comparable property sales and primarily relied on the 29 acre 
parcel in Sagle Idaho. (Tr. 3/8/12, p. 787.) Johnson "adjusted" the Sagle comparable based on 
availability of utilities, the lack of a signalized intersection and lack of direct highway access. (Tr. 
3/8/12, p. 788.) He testified that the remainder portion east of Sylvan Road was worth the same both 
before and after the condemnation. (Tr. 3/8/12, p. 805, 11. 1-2.) Johnson testified that the value of 
the 16.314 acre take was $2,295,360. (Tr. 3/9/12, p. 803, 11. 19-25.) 
Johnson also testified that Grathol would not have developed the entire 56 acre property as a 
single project because only the western 30 acres had realistic potential for retail development. (Tr. 
3/8/12, p. 805, 11. 2-19.) Johnson testified that the value of the entire remainder before the take was 
between $3,060,000 and $3,520,000. (Tr. 3/9/12, pp. 806-07.) Johnson testified that the value of that 
remainder after the take was $2,722,000 based on the impact of the project. (Tr. 3/9/12, p. 811-12, 
11. 15-25, 1-15.) The difference in those values was Johnson's opinion of severance damages 
ranging from $338,000 to $798,000. (Tr. 3/9/12, pp. 813-14, 11. 16-25, 1-20.) Johnson testified that 
the severance damages, added to the value of the take resulted just compensation owed in the range 
of $2,633,360 to $3,093,360. (Tr. 3/9/12, pp. 814-15, 11. 21-25, 1-4, Ex. p. 962.) 
Appraiser Pynes testified as a rebuttal witness for ITD. Pynes testified that he had also 
conducted an appraisal of the Grathol property and had reviewed the other appraisals submitted (Tr. 
3/9/13, pp. 839-40.) Exhibit 14 lA contained a summary of Pynes' value "conclusions." (Ex., pp. 
585-86.) Pynes testified that his value for the Grathol property both before and after the take was 
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$0.95 per square foot and that the amount of just compensation was $675,000. (Tr. 3/9/12, p. 842, 11. 
17-22, p. 844, IL 4-7.) Like Moe, Pynes concluded there were no severance damages or special 
benefits. (Tr. 3/9/12, p. 844, 11. 11-25.) Pynes determined that the larger parcel consisted of the 
entire 56.8 acres. (Tr. 3/9/12, p. 859, 11. 18-24.) Pynes testified that the "use" of the property was 
vacant and would be vacant for a long time. (fr. 3/9/12, p. 860, 11. 20-22, pp. 862-63, 11. 22-25, 1-
11.) Pynes' opinion was that the highest and best use of the property was to hold it for future 
development only. (Tr. 3/9/12, p. 863, 11. 18-24.) Pynes also employed a comparable market 
analysis and made adjustments for time and size. (Tr. 3/9/12, p. 885.) Pynes also testified that the 
determination of the larger parcel lies in the discretion of the appraiser. (Tr. 3/9/12, p. 948, 11. 3-11.) 
Moe also testified in rebuttal, criticizing Johnson and Sherwood's analysis. Moe attacked the 
discounted methodology used by Johnson and Sherwood to arrive at their opinions of value as of the 
date of the take. However, on cross examination, Moe admitted to using the same methodology in 
other appraisals of his own, including a past appraisal of one of the properties that he and Sherwood 
had identified as a comparable. (Tr. 3/9/12, pp. 992-96, Ex. pp. 964-66.) 
Finally, Hedley spoke in rebuttal for ITD on the property's development potential. (Tr. 
3/8/12, pp. 706-07.) Hedley testified that he worked with ITD's other expert consultants to calculate 
costs of development, approvals, utilities and to critique feasibility. (Tr. 3/8/12, p. 707.) In response 
to questions by ITD's counsel, Hedley testified that the remainder after the taking was far more 
costly to develop than it was before the take. (fr. 3/8/12, p. 720.) Hedley testified that he looked at 
Grathol's proposed "before" and "after" conceptual site plans and calculated what it would cost to 
prepare the entire 56 acre property (less the 16 acres taken) for development. (Tr. 3/8/12, pp. 730-
-10-
31.) Hedley testified that the cost to develop the property before the take would be $4.92 per square 
foot. (Tr. 3/8/12, pp. 734-35, 11. 16-25, 1.) Upon ITD's questioning Hedley then testified that the 
costs for development of the remaining property after the take increased to $6.92 per square foot. 
(Tr. 3/8/12, p. 736, 11. 2-19.) On cross-examination, Hedley confirmed that under his analysis, the 
cost to Grathol to develop the remainder property (as contemplated in Grathol's conceptual plans) 
after ITD's take actually increased by $2.00 per square foot. (Tr. 3/8/12, pp. 745-46, 11. 3-25, 1-9.) 
After the Court trial concluded the parties submitted their post-trial briefs and reply briefs. 
(R., pp. 1011-64, 1138-1264.) The District Court then issued a Post-Trial Memorandum and Order. 
(R., pp. 1265-98.) The District Court subsequently found ITD to be the prevailing party and 
awarded ITD $24,298.56 for costs and discretionary costs on August 29, 2012 and entered an Order 
and Judgment to that effect. (Tr. 8/29/12, R., pp. 1611-13.) This appeal ensued. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Grathol believes that the following questions accurately summarize the issues on appeal: 
1) Did the trial court err in its legal and factual treatment of the larger parcel? 
2) Did the trial court err in its treatment of uncontested testimony as to severance 
damages caused by the taking? 
3) Did the trial court err in disallowing testimony concerning Sylvan Road? 
4) Did the trial court err in awarding costs and discretionary costs to ITD? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's conclusions of law are subject to free review. Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 
675, 679, 946 P.2d 975, 979 (1997); Carney v. Heinson, 133 Idaho 275, 278, 985 P.2d 1137, 
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1140 (1999). Questions of law or "mixed" questions of law and fact ordinarily call for free 
review on appeal. Treasure Valley Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Earth Res. Co., Inc., 115 Idaho 
373, 375, 766 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Ct. App. 1988). See generally, IDAHO APPELLATE 
HANDBOOK, Standards of Appellate Review in State and Federal Courts 3.2. l (Idaho Law 
Foundation, Inc. 1985). "Unless a mixed question of fact and law is primarily factual, we review 
mixed questions de nova. " Thornock by Baugh v. Boise Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 115 Idaho 466, 
767 P.2d 1241 (1988). Because of the District Court's treatment of this condemnation as mixed 
questions of law and fact, free review is required. 
Free review of a trial court's conclusions of law and factual determinations is especially 
necessary when constitutionally protected interests are implicated. Thompson v. Thompson, 110 
Idaho 93, 95-96, 714 P.2d 62, 64-65 (Ct. App. 1986), citing, Bose v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 
485, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 12 
L.Ed.2d 793 (1964). Nowhere are more fundamental constitutional interests implicated than in 
an eminent domain proceeding. See E.g., City of Dallas v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 562, 55 
Tex.Sup. Ct. J. 2 71 (2012) applying the "constitutional fact" doctrine to takings. 
This Court reviews a trial court's evidentiary rulings under the abuse of discretion 
standard. A1ains v. Cach, 143 Idaho 221, 224, 141 P.3d 1090, 1093 (2006). Error in the 
admission or exclusion of evidence is not reversible unless a substantial right of the party 
challenging the trial court's evidentiary ruling is affected. I.RE. 103; State v. Babbitt, 120 Idaho 
337,342,815 P.2d 1077, 1082 (Ct.App.1991). 
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Appellate review of an award of fees and costs under LC. § 12 -117 is subject to an abuse 
of discretion standard. City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906,277 P.3d 353 (2012). 
ARGUMENT 
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ITS LEGAL AND FACTUAL TREATMENT OF 
THE LARGER PARCEL? 
Determination of the larger parcel is an analytical appraisal tool that is unique to eminent 
domain. It is not encountered in general appraisal assignments, and, because of its infrequent 
appearance, it is easily misunderstood and often misapplied both by appraisers and courts. Ibis 
analytical tool is applied when a portion, but not the whole, of property is condemned leaving the 
property ovvner with remnants of what was previously owned. The larger parcel analysis informs on 
both the value of what was taken in relation to a greater tract, and on the value of the remaining 
portion of that greater tract after the "take" has occurred. 
Blacks Law Dictionary defines the larger parcel thusly: 
Eminent domain. A portion of land that is not a complete parcel, but 
is the greater part of an even bigger tract, entitling the owner to 
damages both for the parcel taken and for severance from the tract 
To grant both kinds of damages, a court generally requires the owner 
to show unity of ownership, unity of use and contiguity of the land. 
Black's Law Dictionary, abr.7th ed., s.v. "larger parcel." Another definition is found in the 
Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal: 
In governmental land acquisitions, the tract or tracts of land that 
are under the beneficial control of a single individual or entity and 
have the same, or an integrated, highest and best use. Elements for 
consideration by the appraiser in making a determination in this 
regard are contiguity, or proximity, as it bears on the highest and 
best use of the property, unity of ownership, and unity of highest 
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and best use. In most states, unity of ownership, contiguity, and 
unity of use are the three conditions that establish the larger parcel 
for the consideration of severance damages. In federal and some 
state cases, however, contiguity is sometimes subordinated to 
unitary use. 
Appraisal Institute, The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal, 5th ed., s.v. "larger parcel." 
(Chicago: Appraisal Institute, 2010). 
Just compensation is based in part on fair market value, which is the price for which the 
property could be sold by an owner willing to sell to a willing purchaser on the date of the taking. 
Ada County Highway Dist. v. Magwire, 104 Idaho 656, 658-59, 662 P.2d 237, 239-40 (1983). 
The fair market value determination in an eminent domain case is intended to retroactively value 
and replicate what a hypothetical sale price would have been between the property owner and a 
buyer on the open market, in consideration of all those marketplace factors that an informed 
buyer would have considered on the date of condemnation. Id Accordingly, it is appropriate to 
consider all those elements which a prospective purchaser could reasonably urge as affecting fair 
market value. State ex rel. Rich v. Halverson, 86 Idaho 242,248,384 P.2d 480,483 (1963). 
All facts which would influence a person of ordinary prudence, 
desiring to purchase the property, are admissible [to prove market 
value] ... and any evidence is admissible which might reasonably 
influence a willing seller and a willing buyer. 
United States v. JOO Acres of Land, 468 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir.1972) (internal citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). Those influencing elements are not subject to a check list of 
variables, but instead encompass all market factors which impact a property's value including its 
potential usability, divisibility, location, accessibility, marketability, visibility and so forth. 
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In order to determine the fair market value of the condemned property, the trier of fact 
must consider not only the uses to which the property is devoted at the time of the taking, but 
instead all the uses for which the property is suitable. State ex rel. Symms v. City of Mountain 
Home, 94 Idaho 528, 530, 493 P.2d 387, 389 (1972). This is termed the "highest and best use." 
The use for which the property is adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably 
near future. Any possible use is to be considered, not necessarily as a measure of value, but to 
the full extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the market value of the property. 
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 54 S.Ct. 704, 78 L.Ed. 1236 (1934); City of Caldwell v. 
Roark, 92 Idaho 99, 437 P.2d 615 (1968).2 
In addition to valuing the property taken, just compensation requires a determination of 
severance damages; i.e. those impacts upon the remainder property after that take has occurred. 
When such reasonable market value of the part taken has been 
determined and fixed, appellant is then entitled to further recover 
the damages to the remainder. This latter sum is determined by the 
market value of such remainder before and after the taking. The 
difference in value is the severance damage. 
State ex rel. Rich v. Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho 45, 55-56, 286 P.2d 1112, 1118 (1955). Idaho Code 
§ 7-711(2) states: 
If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a 
larger parcel: ( a) the damages which will accrue to the portion not 
sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance from the 
portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the 
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff. 
Idaho Code § 7-711 (2) ( emphasis added). 
2 For example a piece of property presently being farmed or held fallow must be valued as if it is commercial 
property if it is subject to no zoning restrictions; is large enough to support a profitable commercial use and; is 
located where a profitable commercial use is reasonably foreseeable sometime in the future. 
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But the difference in value of the remainder before and after the take is not the only way 
to "measure" severance damages. 
The larger parcel determination informs on both the highest and best use of a property 
and the damages which will accrue to the portion not taken ( and thus its market value as of the 
date of the take). Therefore, the larger parcel is a keystone inquiry upon which the entire 
valuation hinges. It is fundamentally a factual inquiry which must be made by the appraiser in 
undertaking their valuation and lies in their discretion. Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J.D. 
Eaton, Appraisal Institute, p. 76 (2nd ed. 1995). The Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal 
Land Acquisitions speaks to this point: 
Often essential in the appraiser's consideration of the highest and 
best use is the conclusion concerning the larger parcel. Because the 
ultimate determination of highest and best use is the appraiser's 
to make, and that determination cannot be made until after 
considerable investigation and analysis has been completed, the 
appraiser's conclusion as to the larger parcel is sometimes 
different from the specific parcel he or she was requested to 
appraise by the agency. 
Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1992), § B-1-14, p. 73 (emphasis added). 
The larger parcel determination is in the strict purview of the appraiser. This proposition 
has been affirmed by other courts see, but never specifically addressed in Idaho. The lack of clear 
authority on this point troubled the District Court, and unfortunately led to error. 
There is no set formula for determining the larger parcel. It is a flexible concept applied 
based on the facts. "The larger parcel may be all of one parcel, part of a parcel, or several 
parcels, depending to varying degrees on unity of ownership, unity of use and contiguity." Real 
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Estate Valuation in Litigation, J.D. Eaton, Appraisal Institute at p. 76 (2nd ed. 1995). "Like many 
other elements in condemnation appraisal, the tests to determine the larger parcel (i.e., unity of 
ownership, unity of use, and contiguity) cannot be applied universally and blindly ... courts have 
ruled that all three tests need not be met in every instance." Id. at 78. "When the evidence 
provides an adequate foundation by common sense and market data showing different highest 
and best uses, we see no reason why it is improper to consider a large tract of property, as if, in 
the before condition, it were divisible into separate hypothetical entities." 4A Nichols on Eminent 
Domain§ 14.02 atpp. 14-34. 
Rationally identifying the larger parcel limits the appraiser's judgment of value to those 
parcels or parts of parcels that are most directly affected by the condemnation. The larger parcel 
is not a rigid or inflexible concept but instead is a question of fact and the fact-finder is to 
consider evidence of the use, appearance of the land, its legal division or divisibility, and the 
intent of its owner. State ex rel. Symms v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528, 493 P.2d 387 
(1972), citing 4A Nichols§ 14.31. 
While few Idaho cases have specifically addressed the larger parcel question, those cases 
that have recognize that all three "factors"3 need not be present in order to determine what 
constitutes the larger parcel. See also, Eaton, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, supra at p. 78. 
For example, in State ex rel. Rich v. Halverson, 86 Idaho 242, 384 P.2d 480 (1963), the State 
appealed from the trial court's denial of a motion for new trial after a jury verdict in a partial 
condemnation action. Property owners cross appealed the trial court's exclusion of evidence of 
3 Unity of use, contiguity, unity of ownership/title. 
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severance damages to a non-contiguous tract also owned by them. Id. at 246, 384 P.2d 482. The 
"home parcel" for which the landowners sought severance damages was situated across the 
highway from the land being condemned. However, while the condemned parcel was used as a 
service station, tavern and novelty shop, the home parcel was only used as a residence. The 
Halverson court adopted the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, concerning the 
"standard of unity" when dealing with claims of severance damage to non-contiguous parcels of 
land. "In such a case it is generally held that the two tracts can be considered as one only when 
they are so inseparably connected in the use to which they are applied that the taking of one 
necessarily and permanently injures the other." Id. at 248, 384 P.2d 484, citing Sasso v. Housing 
Authority of th.e City of Providence, 82 R.I. 451, 11 A.2d 226 (1955). The Halverson court 
rejected the landowner's theory of assemblage, not based on non-contiguity, but instead because 
the uses of the properties were unconnected and the taking of one did not necessarily impact the 
use of the other. What is important though is that the Halverson court recognized that the larger 
parcel analysis requires flexibility in its application. 
In State ex rel. Symms v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,493 P.2d 387 (1972), this 
Court again recognized the larger parcel analysis can be used to combine separate (non-
contiguous) parcels to demonstrate the adaptability of a condemned property for a specific use. 
In that case, the focus was on potential future use of mostly vacant property. Fourteen acres of a 255 
acre parcel was condemned for a new highway which would bisect the larger (255 acre) parcel 
owned by the City of Mountain Home. Part of the 255 acres had a golf course. The portion 
condemned was separated from the golf course by a drainage ditch. Id. at 530, 493 P.2d 389. 
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Because the State refused to provide an underpass to connect the bisected parcels, the City of 
Mountain Home maintained that the development of the remainder parcels as a unified site became 
impossible. The jury verdict reflected a finding that the larger parcel encompassed the integrated 
properties including the portion used as the golf course on the other side of the drainage ditch.4 On 
appeal, the State argued that the landowner could not be awarded for severance damages to the golf 
course land because there was no unity of use, no unity of ownership and the parcels were not 
contiguous. Id. at 531, 493 P.2d 391. The Mountain Home court stated that whether two pieces of 
land constitute a single parcel is a practical question based in part upon the intent of the landowner. 
It held that substantial evidence of the intent for eventual integrated use of the land on both sides of 
the ditch supported the landowner's larger parcel theory. Id. "Under a statute such as our [LC. § 7-
711 ], it is not the identity of uses of the condemned and remaining land which is determinative; 
what is significant is the dependency of the value on the remaining land upon its use in conjunction 
with the condemned land." Id at 532. 493 P.2d 391. 
The take away of these cases is that the larger parcel analysis is not a one-size-fits-all, 
formulaic proposition. The analysis must be tailored to the specific property being considered in 
light of its use, future use(s) and its owner's intent. In the case of bare, undeveloped land, that 
inquiry necessarily requires even more analysis, since bare, undeveloped ground is not being put to 
a "use." Instead, the highest and best use analysis requires the fact finder to evaluate the 
characteristics of the land and feasibility of what potential uses that property could be put towards, 
with consideration of the owner's particular plans for development. See IDJI 7.14. 
4 The State contended that the "larger parcel" was only that portion of the 255 acres adjacent to the drainage ditch. 
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Despite ample authority that a fact-based inquiry is required as opposed to a rigid, formulaic 
approach, the District Court in this case repeatedly demonstrated that it rejected any concept of a 
larger parcel encompassing less than the entirety of the Grathol property. Consider the following 
ruminations of the District Court: 
And I don't think it's all my fault. So, I mean, normally you'd come 
in here, you have a larger parcel. That's not a methodology thing by 
the appraiser. That's a question that's resolved by the jury. It's a 
question of fact. And the fact that Mr. Sherwood likes to divide it up 
into 3 0 acres is neither here nor there ... 
*** 
I understand the reasoning of Mr. Sherwood as an appraiser. What's 
that got to do with the legal definition, the factual finding of what the 
larger parcel is? Nothing. Okay. 
*** 
So --- it cuts both ways. So I don't have that. I don't have a 57 acres. 
I have a 30 acres. How in heaven's name would a competent 
appraiser appraise a parcel that's imaginary? I don't even know 
where it hits the section line. Does it take in Sylvan Road? Does it 
not? I don't know. Nobody knows where this parcel is. How do you 
sell a parcel that doesn't have a legal description.[?] How do you get 
a fair market value for a piece of ground that doesn't exist? I'm not 
sure about all that. This is all very confusing to me. 
(Tr. 2/2/12, Vol. I. p. 66, 11. 12-18, pp. 67-68, 11. 20-25, 1-4, pp. 68-69, 11. 16-25, 1.) (emphasis 
added.) The District Court continued later: 
Well, yeah. Sure I mean, of course. But the law requires that the 
parcel that is a contiguous parcel be, in fact, treated by the fact finder 
as a contiguous parcel. I would instruct the jury that the fact that an 
appraiser has come up with a development scheme that parses off 30 
acres that could be developed is of absolutely no relevance to their 
determination of the larger parcel. In essence I don't see how there 
would be any evidence any trier of fact could find the larger parcel to 
be anything other than 57 acres. 
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(Tr. 2/2/12, Vol. I. p. 80, ll. 8-18) (emphasis added) This refusal of the trial judge at the pre-trial 
hearing stage to even consider anything other than Grathol's entire 57 acres as the larger parcel was 
a harbinger of the error to come. The District Court then proceeded at trial to do exactly as it 
telegraphed it would. It disregarded competent and often uncontroverted evidence and stated in its 
Decision that the creation of a hypothetical parcel within the parent tract is not allowed under Idaho 
law. (R., p. 1276.) In doing so the Court committed clear error by effectively precluding any 
consideration of a valuation methodology that, not only is not disallowed, but is in accordance with 
the weight of authority both here and elsewhere. 
This first error, like the first domino in a line, led the Court to willfully ignore evidence at 
trial supporting Grathol's theory of the larger parcel which cascaded down to a determination of 
value for the take and the remainder that was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Before trial, the 
Court stated that it could not envision any evidence that would support the creation of a larger 
parcel less than the whole. However during the trial ample evidence was introduced on this point 
Sherwood's Appraisal report was introduced into evidence at trial. It stated: 
• That the entire subject property's size is much larger than typically utilized 
for large retail uses which range from 10 to 30 acres. (R., p. 671.) 
• That the corner location of the property at the intersection suggests 
commercial uses as a highest and best use. (Id.) 
• That the owner is in negotiations with commercial tenants and potential uses 
could include grocery, travel truck plaza, big box retail, specialized retail, 
motel and convenience store. (Id.) 
• That only about ½ of the subject site would be put to these uses with the 
balance put to some type of self-storage, residential or light industrial use. 
(Id.) 
-21-
Sherwood also noted that the extension of Sylvan Road will bisect the site, changing the 
original highest and best use analysis of the site, because the extension will reduce the usability of 
the original western half of the site and form a boundary. (R., pp. 672, 677.) Sherwood viewed the 
site as being developed in two phases with the western 30 acres closest to the intersection to be 
developed as an integrated development. (R., p. 673.) Sherwood also clearly spoke about his 
reasoning on the larger parcel question: 
A. Well, in this particular case, I viewed that as a large commercial 
tract. In my experience in the market, the largest typical commercial 
developments that I'm aware of are in the range of approximately 30 
acres. So I viewed this as the comer of the property of Highway 95 
and 54, that the 30 acres was the larger parcel. 
(Tr. 3/7/12, pp. 492-93, 11. 17-25, 1.) Sherwood testified that the decision as to the larger parcel is a 
judgment call for an appraiser to make, then testified that the property was under one ownership and 
largely contiguous but the 30 acres on the western side has a different use than the remainder of the 
"parent" tract. 
Q .... what you consider to be the larger parcel. That is a judgment 
call for you as the appraiser, correct? 
A. Certainly. It's not just myself. I mean, when I have discussed 
this property, I've discussed it with a couple brokers in the office 
about development of that site, and they were of the same belief 
that the 30 acres on the comer has a different use than the back 
portion of the property, so to speak, the property that runs along 
Highway 54 deeper. 
(Tr. 3/7/12, pp. 496, 11. 10-20.) Sherwood explained how a portion of a large property can constitute 
the larger parcel for valuation purposes, specifically when that portion has a different use and a 
different value than the other. (Tr. 3/7/12, p. 496-97.) He stated that the proposed extension of 
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Sylvan serves as a "dividing line" of the property with each side (of the line) having different uses, 
and testified that he primarily considered the west 30 acres to be the larger parcel because it had a 
separate "use" than the remainder based on the market for commercial users of property. (Tr. 
3/7/12, pp. 497-98.) 
Geoff Reeslund testified that he created several "conceptual" site plans for development of 
the property. (Tr. 3/6/12, pp. 384-92.) These concept plans were developed as a tool to analyze the 
potential uses of the property. (R., pp. 951-56.) Reeslund also testified that subsequent to Grathol 
acquiring the property, they learned that IID was recommending an extension of Sylvan Road 
straight across the Grathol property, which impacted how much land would be left for development. 
(Tr. 3/6/12, pp. 395-96, 398-99.) This played into the concept plans. Reeslund also testified that any 
development of the property would require a self-contained sewer disposal system on-site because 
service was unavailable from the City of Athol. (Tr. 3/6/12, pp. 373-74.) Reeslund testified that 
Grathol hired an engineer Jim Coleman to design the sewer system. (Id.) 
Coleman testified that he had designed a wastewater treatment system that could be 
incorporated within the commercial development requiring little space. During Coleman's 
testimony the District Court was dubious based on its (erroneous) position that the larger parcel 
could not be anything less than the entire 56.8 acres. While counsel explained to the District Court 
the relevance of Coleman's testimony; that the highest and best use of the 30-acre larger parcel was 
not dependent upon the use of the ( eastern) remainder for a sewer system, the District Court simply 
chose to disregard Coleman's testimony: 
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The Court: ... I wouldn't give an ounce of weight to what he's 
testifying to, because I have no idea how it would have any relevance 
to the valuation issue which I have to decide. 
Mr. Marfice: Your honor, you don't have the entire valuation issue 
before you at this time. Mr. Sherwood was not the only valuation 
witness identified. You will hear more valuation testimony from Mr. 
Johnson. And a large part of what Mr. Coleman is intended to testify 
to, is foundational to Mr. Johnson's valuation opinion, which is inter-
related to the utility of the remainder parcel. 
(Tr. 3/8/12, p. 670, 11. 8-22.) The District Court however persisted in its "eyes wide shut" approach 
to the relevant evidence: 
Well, I couldn't care less about the nature and size of the sewer 
system, and it doesn't have anything to do with fair market value 
either. 
(Tr. 3/8/12, p. 676, IL 3-4.) Clearly, the District Court had already decided that Coleman's testimony 
concerned only the profitability of a proposed future project and that such testimony was 
tangential. (Tr. 3/8/12, p. 680, 11. 14-20.) The District Court considered such testimony "utterly 
irrelevant" and "wouldn't have anything to do with anything." (Tr. 3/8/12, p. 680, 11. 18-20.) 
Attempting to bring the District Court's focus back to the actual evidence being offered, 
counsel again tried to explain to the Court what the purpose of Coleman's testimony was: 
The Court: I'm sure there's lots of other - you know, if the purpose 
of Mr. Coleman is to establish that he has looked at the 56.8 acres 
and he has been able to design a wastewater disposal system that he 
thinks would serve a commercial development located on the 56.8 
acres and both attorneys agree that's true-
Mr. Marfice: I certainly agree that this is true. In addition, Mr. 
Coleman would testify that this wastewater treatment system could 
conceivably be placed on far less than 56 acres. 
*** 
The Court: Far less than 56.8 acres. Far less than 56.8 acres. What's 
the point of that? 
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:Mr. Marfice: The system could conceivably be placed on the 30 
acres to the west side, taking up virtually no part of the area to the 
east of the quarter section line that is the extension of Sylvan Road. 
In other words, it bolsters the larger parcel analysis that Mr. 
Sherwood testified about. 
(Tr. 3/8/12, p. 683, 11. 1-20.) All for naught. The trial judge had already decided that the western 30-
acre larger parcel was only created for purposes of litigation not based on the highest and best use of 
the property. (Tr. 3/8/12, pp. 687-89.) 
These exchanges between the District Court and counsel (a) reflect the District Court's 
fundamental misunderstanding of the evidence and (b) demonstrate that the District Court had 
already decided what the evidence offered at trial would show. The District Court arrived at these 
conclusions before trial even began, continued with this perspective during the presentation of 
evidence and concluded with its decision. The District Court was simply unVvilling to consider any 
evidence supporting Grathol's position on the larger parcel because the trial judge erroneously 
believed that the law precluded it. 
Alan Johnson testified at trial that the property was conceptually divided to the east and west 
of what would be the Sylvan Road extension. (Tr. 3/8/12, pp. 785-86.) Johnson also testified that 
Grathol would not have developed the entire 56 acre property as a single development because the 
western 30 acres had the potential and feasibility for retail development as an economic unit. (Tr. 
3/8/12, p. 805, IL 2-19.) 
In opposition, the State chose not to present any evidence that the highest and best use of the 
property was dependent in any manner upon both the eastern and western parcels being developed 
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as one integrated use. rm did not cross-examine Jim Coleman, leaving it uncontroverted that an 
on-site modular sewer treatment system could be designed and incorporated entirely on the west 30 
acre larger parcel. Instead ITD continued to advocate a 56 acre larger parcel. For its part, the 
District Court remained myopic, writing in its Memorandum Decision: 
At trial, ITD argued that Grathol needed the entire 56.8 acres for its 
commercial/retail development; however, this Court finds that there 
is insufficient evidence, if any evidence at all, in support of ITD's 
argument. Grathol's expert witness and appraiser ("Sherwood") 
testified repeatedly that he used 30 acres because he could not find 
any instances where a commercial/retail development, that was 
comparable to the type of project he believed to be appropriate for 
the property, had needed more than 30 acres ... Furthermore, Grathol 
put in evidence that wastewater for the proposed project could be 
disposed of on-site in a number of different ways. 
Therefore, this Court rejects the suggestion that Grathol 's proposed 
project required the easterly 26 acres in order to dispose of waste, 
because Grathol 's theory of the larger parcel for this case was that it 
would not need more than 30 acres to develop its commercia1/retail 
project. 
(R, at p. 1274.) The District Court even went on to state that Sherwood's identification of the 30 
acre parcel was both "logical" and "credible" but then found that it was factually unpersuasive when 
considering "all other evidence." (R., at p. 1281.). Which begs the question: What other evidence? 
It is apparent that the District Court ruled as it did because it was unwilling to consider why the 
larger parcel should be 30 acres: 
Grathol's reasons for separating the 30 acres out of the 58.6 is based 
upon Sherwood's opinion of increased value of the thirty acres, due 
to the suitability of its location for Grathol's proposed 
commercial/retail development within the 56.8 acre parent tract. 
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(R., p. 1279) (emphasis added.) However Sherwood never said any such thing. The Court went on: 
"It is even more problematic where the basis for defining the larger is based not upon a different 
highest and best use, but solely upon a greater dollar value for the hypothetical parcel than for the 
rest of the parent tract." (R., p. 1280) (emphasis added.) Again, no such testimony or evidence was 
ever presented. 
Grathol' s larger parcel theory focused on the separate, independent uses of the property in 
connection with one another in the future. There was no dispute as to unity of ownership, and only a 
minor dispute as to whether contiguity existed (by reason of the Sylvan Road implications). 
However, the District Court's reasoning seriously faltered at its analysis of integrated "use." 
The history of unity of title, contiguity and unity of use for the 56.8 
acres, and the evidence of potential use, supports a common sense, 
logical finding, based upon the factual record, that the 56.8 acres is 
one integral unit. Even Grathol's evidence of the future use for the 
56.8 acres is the same, to wit: commercial development. Grathol's 
proposed future project had design plans, admitted into evidence, 
showing an encroachment into Sherwood's "surplus" easterly 26 
acres. 
(R., p. 1281) (emphasis added.) The District Court appears to have focused on Grathol's conceptual 
site plans and totally disregarded testimony offered at trial that the properties would not be 
integrated in the future. Instead, the District Court simply concluded that the historic use as bare, 
undeveloped ground was an "integrated use," even though ITD's own appraisers admitted that the 
larger parcel analysis for bare ground required a forward looking analysis at what the property could 
be used for in the future. (Tr. 3/5/12, p. 147, 11. 14-17.) The District Court also ignored the 
undisputed testimony from all of Grathol's valuation witnesses that the value of the remainder 
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property east of the Sylvan Road corridor would be unaffected by the take. In doing so, the District 
Court erred by not considering the uses to which the property would be put. Accord, State ex rel. 
Symms v. City ofA1ountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,493 P.2d 387 (1972). 
Grathol's position on the larger parcel is not at all unique, preposterous or unsupported. 
Instead, it reflects a common sense, market based approach for valuing property based on the 
highest and best use to which the property will actually be put. It is not a theoretical exercise. 
Evidence as to the reasonable probabilities of prospective uses of the condemned land is always 
admissible. Although inherently speculative, such evidence must be considered when ascertaining 
market value because a hypothetical buyer will purchase land with an eye to not only its existing use 
but to other potential uses as well. United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762, 781 (5th Cir. 
1979). That same market based approach to valuation is reflected in Idaho jurisprudence as well. 
In City of Orofino v. Swcyne, 95 Idaho 125,504 P.2d 398 (1972), the City condemned 1.59 
acres of land for highway improvement. The 1.59 acres was part of a larger 93 acre tract of land. 
Prior to the trial the landowners disclaimed the right to seek severance damages to the remainder by 
reason of the condemnation. At trial, the City sought to introduce testimony that the remainder land 
increased in value as a result of the highway construction. The trial court rejected this finding that 
the land taken was an independent economic unit. Id. at 127, 504 P.2d 400. The trial court also held 
that special benefits to the remainder of the land could not be offset against the value of the part 
taken. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. The Orofino court even noted 
that the prohibition against offsets was particularly appropriate when the land taken was an 
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independent economic unit, citing \Vith approval, Territory by Sharpless v. Adelmeyer, 45 Haw. 
144,363 P.2d 979 (1961) which held: 
Vlhere, as here, the parcels taken approach such size and character 
as to assume proportions of independent economic use, in the light 
of the highest and best use of the land, the rationale of the rule of 
valuing 'the whole first, then on that basis, assign a value to the 
part condemned' dissolves into meaninglessness. 
Id. at 155, 363 P.2d 986. The holding of Sharpless was not that a condemned parcel had to be in 
and of itself an independent unit, but instead when the parcels approached such size, character 
and use as to assume proportions of independent economic use, then they could be valued as 
such. The Sharpless decision demonstrates that the larger parcel for purposes of valuation may 
easily be a portion of the property less than the entire parent tract, when such parcel has 
independent economic use in light of the highest and best use of land. The import of the City of 
Orofino decision is the (at least) implicit recognition of something that the District Court here 
thought was "flat \'vTong under Idaho law." (Tr. 3/9/12, p. 1007, 1. 14, p. 1009, 1. 1, p. 1011, ll. 4-6, 
p. 1012, 11. 20-24.)That is, that the land taken does not always have to be considered a portion of the 
entire property owned by the lando\1v11ers, especially when the land taken is of such size, shape and 
utility to be an independent economic unit. 
Other jurisdictions have readily adopted this view. In City of Phoenix v. Wilson, 200 Ariz. 2, 
21 P .3d 388 (2001 ), the City condemned a portion of lando\\,llers' 23 .24-acre vacant property for a 
fire station. The City took 1.4 acres. As in this case, the "take" area was at the very comer of the 
parcel and situated on the intersection of two adjacent streets. The trial court permitted the 
landowners' expert witness to estimate damages based on an opinion that a portion of the property 
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had a different highest and best use from the rest, just as Grathol's valuation witnesses did. The 
landowners' appraiser testified that the property had different highest and best uses in different 
locations. Id at 4, 21 P.3d 390. The jury returned a verdict based on that theory. The Arizona Court 
of Appeals stated that the property taken should have been valued either as a discrete, separate unit 
or as part of the entire parcel, but not as part of a hypothetical, economic unit less than the entire 
property. 
On review, the Arizona Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding 
that there are only two methods of valuation - the part taken as a separate unit or as part of the 
whole. Id. at 6, 21 P.3d 392. The Supreme Court recognized that these approaches are usually 
utilized when there is a "strip-take" in which the part taken, based on the comparable market 
analysis, would not be of any value because of irregularity in size, shape or utility. 5 In those partial 
(strip) takings cases, the Wilson Court observed land should be valued as a part of the whole in 
order to attribute some value for it and protect the condemnee by assuring a just reward. Id. at 7, 21 
P.3d 393. However, as in this case, where the part taken is not an unusable, rm-economic "strip," 
the rules are different. The Wilson Court's succinct analysis is compelling: 
However, the converse is also true: when the units of property are 
actually worth more when valued independently, the landowner 
should have the benefit of that greater, more realistic market-
based value. Emphasizing the role of the market in Buchanan that 
when the part taken has a "Separate and independent economic use 
and could therefore command a higher value as a separate entity, this 
value must be considered without resort to the value of any tract 
from which it was severed." (Internal citations omitted.) This 
5 An example of a "strip take" would be when the "take" was the simple widening of an existing right-of-way along 
the same route. The narrow "strip" for additional right-of-way would not typically be of any use or subject to 
development without use of additional property to increase its size or depth. 
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statement referred only to the monetary value of the part taken and 
not to any tract larger than the taking but smaller than the whole 
parcel. Nowhere in Buchanan, however, did we restrict an expert 
from ascribing different values before the taking to different units 
of the parcel, as White did in the present case. To do so, when the 
market supports different uses and resulting differing valuations, 
would undermine the very rationale on which Buchanan rests: the 
protection of the landowner's interest in receiving just 
compensation based on the highest and best use of the property. 
(Internal citations omitted) Thus, we have never limited such a 
method of valuation to just the part taken and the remainder. 
Id. at 7, 21 P.3d 393 (emphasis added). 
The Wilson Court continued: 
As we have seen, the cases do not support a rigid rule that "the 
property taken should have been valued either as a separate unit or 
as part of the whole parcel" but not "as part of a hypothetical 
parcel within the whole parcel." (Internal citations omitted.) The 
independent value rule exists to protect the landowner from 
being compensated for the most valuable part of his property 
by averaging the market price for the most valuable with that 
of the least valuable land. The obverse of that rule is that when 
the part taken has no independent value before the taking, it must 
be valued based on the average of the whole parcel because the 
part taken, having no independent use, would be valueless. People 
v. Silveira, 236 Cal.App.2d 604, 46 Cal.Rptr. 260, 272 (1965) 
( citing 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 14.231 ). 
Id. at 8, 21 P.3d 394 (emphasis added). The Wilson court wrapped up stating: "when the 
evidence provides an adequate foundation by common sense and market data showing different 
highest and best uses, we see no reason why it is improper to consider a large tract of property, 
as if, in the before condition, it were divisible into separate hypothetical entities. See, 4A 
NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN§ 14.02 at 14-34 (3d ed.rev.1999)." Id. (emphasis added). 
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In Wilson (as in this case), the evidence showed that the landovmers could have 
developed the 5-acre comer property without a concurrent development of the remaining 23.24 
acres. Thus, held the court: "There is no logical reason to prejudice them for owning more 
than the most valuable portion taken." Id. (emphasis added). 
While Wilson is not controlling law in Idaho, its analysis and reasoning mirrors Idaho 
jurisprudence and reflects Idaho's policy favoring private property rights. Similar to Arizona, Idaho 
cases have never restricted an appraiser in his larger parcel determination to the all-or-nothing 
approach adopted by the District Court. Idaho law has never held that an appraiser must estimate 
value based on the take only, or the take as part of an entire parent tract only. Idaho case law has 
always held this is a factual determination based upon a consideration of the take area used in 
conjunction with the remainder. 
Here, the District Court simply refused to follow the evidence because it wrongly believed 
that the law required the value of the take area to be dependent on the residual 26 acre parcel to the 
east of Sylvan. Based on this, the District Court simply disregarded all of Grathol's evidence 
showing that the larger parcel (i.e. the western 30 acre parcel) was an independent, economic unit 
separate and apart from the residual 26 acres. 
The District Court suggests that Grathol invited it to make "new" law in Idaho by adopting 
the reasoning of Wilson. This is not accurate. Grathol advocated that such a larger parcel analysis is 
already permitted under Idaho law. Instead, the District Court erroneously ruled that such an 
approach is contrary to the law. 
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The District Court's bias toward Grathol's larger parcel analysis is likely based, in part on 
its experience in City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 839, 136 P.3d 310 (2006). (R., p. 1276.) In 
Simpson the City sought an injunction requiring landowners to remove fences. The landowners 
counterclaimed for inverse condemnation, alleging violations of due process and equal protection. 
The landowners owned two parcels of land. One consisted of four lots located north of Lakeshore 
Drive and the second consisted of three lots south ofLakeshore Drive on the lakefront. The property 
owners constructed a chain-link fence on the waterward side which the city sought to enjoin. Id. at 
842, 136 P.3d 313. During the underlying litigation, the land o\\'ners quitclaimed the waterward 
parcels to a separate entity, which was then also named in the litigation. Id. at 843, 136 P.3d 314. At 
summary judgment, Judge Hosack dismissed the landowners' inverse condemnation claims 
reasoning that the remaining parcels still retained value when considered as a single parcel. 
On appeal, this Court held that in order to analyze takings claims, one must first determine 
the property at issue and then the value of what has been taken. Id. at 318, 136 P.3d 848. This 
evaluation required a determination of the "denominator" parcel.6 Id. at 319, 136 P.3d 848. In, City 
of Coeur d'Alene a majority of this Court recognized that the task was to identify the parcel as 
realistically and fairly as possible in light of the regulatory scheme and factual circumstances at 
issue. Id. This Court stated that most courts typically reject the so-called "conceptual severance" 
theory - the notion that whole units of property may be divided up for the purpose of a regulatory 
takings claim. Id. citing, Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130, 98 S.Ct. at 2662. The City of Coeur d'Alene 
majority held however, that the trial court's ruling that a transfer of the waterward parcel to a 
6 The "denominator'' parcel in the inverse condemnation law arena is much like the "larger parcel" in traditional 
condemnation. 
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separate entity had no effect and the uses of the properties had not changed, was in error. Id. at 849, 
136 P.3d 320. While the record showed that the landowners still used the parcel in the same manner, 
it was undisputed that the waterward parcel was owned by a separate legal entity. The Court held 
that the record did not support the District Court's conclusion that the denominator parcel 
necessarily consisted of both the upland and waterward properties and it was improper for the judge 
to effectively ignore the separate ownerships, because evidence of the intent and purpose behind the 
transfer was relevant to the denominator parcel determination since the purpose of that 
determination is to define the property as realistically and fairly as possible in light of all the factual 
circumstances.Id. 
Here, the District Court also cited State ex. rel. Symms v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 
528,531,493 P.2d 387,390 (1972) in support of its findings. (R., at p. 1276.) The Mountain Home 
case however recognizes that flexibility is needed in the larger parcel analysis, which affirmed the 
jury's findings of value based on assembling two tracts of land. The only support for Judge 
Hosack' s decision is found in the following language: 
If as a matter of fact, the parcel taken is part of a larger tract held 
by the same owner, it is error to consider such parcel as if it 
constituted an entire tract separate and apart from other property in 
the possession of the owner; the amount awarded must reflect any 
enhanced value arising from its availability for use in conjunction 
with the land not taken. 
Id. at 531, 493 P.2d 390 (emphasis added). However, the holding of the Mountain Home case 
recognizes that the uses must be in connection with one another in order to support a finding of a 
larger parcel as an integrated economic unit. 
-34-
The District Court appears to recognize that the analysis of the larger parcel is based on use, 
but then simply concludes that the highest and best use of the entire Grathol property is the same, 
to-wit "commercial development." The District Court based its decision on simply the zoning 
designation (commercial) of the property without considering that the future uses of the property 
envisioned by Grathol were not integrated. A single broad label of "commercial development" is 
not a "use." One can envision many different types of uses all within a commercial development 
which uses and value of the property on which they occur are independent of one another. 7 
While the District Court ruled that the facts did not support a 30 acre separate development, 
it failed to provide any factual support for that ruling. The District Court's factual findings were 
simply based on the Court's decision that the larger parcel must encompass everything, despite all 
economic, logical, factual and market based evidence to the contrary. 
It is perhaps instructive to consider the District Court's approach to Grathol's valuation and 
larger parcel theory as if this case had been a jury trial. Undisputedly, a condemnee does not waive 
his rights to a proper consideration of the law simply because it elects to have a judge sitting as the 
trier of fact. The standards and rules of law do not change. If this case had gone to a jury, the 
question is: What would the jury instructions issued by this District Court have looked like? As 
demonstrated in the District Court's remarks during the proceedings, it would certainly have erred 
in instructing the jury: 
7 Uses may be complimentary to one another without being integrated. Consider Grathol's conceptual site plans 
offered in evidence and largely ignored by the District Court. The contemplated uses include retail (grocery store, 
shops), hospitality (restaurants, fast food), lodging (hotel), travel services (service station) and mixed uses (travel 
plaza, convenience store). 
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At the pre-trial Motion in Limine hearing, this Court cautioned 
Grathol that if this were a jury trial, the law was not clear as to 
whether this Court should allow a jury to consider Sherwood's use of 
the 30-acre hypothetical parcel as the larger parcel. Even if the Court 
were to consider adopting Wilson, that case does not hold that the 
jury, as fact finder could consider Sherwood's methodology, because 
the highest and best use in this case is the same for the entire 56.8 
acres. The fact that there is no existing Idaho law similar to Wilson 
would raise this Court's concern over allowing a jury to consider 
Sherwood's 30 acres as the larger parcel. It is even more problematic 
where the basis for defining the larger parcel is based not upon a 
highest and best use, but solely upon a greater dollar value for the 
hypothetical parcel than for the rest of the parent tract. No case law 
on point has been submitted which this Court has found to address 
this issue. 
(R., at. p. 1280.) See, also Tr. 8/29/12, p. 45, 11. 14-25, 1. It is clear from the trial judge's comments 
that it would have instructed the jury on the larger parcel and would have thereby tainted the jury's 
consideration of that evidence. It is evident that the District Court effectively treated itself to the 
same erroneous instruction. \Vhile the Court concluded that it need not reach a decision as to 
whether Grathol's larger parcel approach was permitted because it found that the "preponderance of 
the evidence" supported a 56.8 acre larger parcel - there was, in fact, simply no evidence to support 
such a finding. The District Court's inability to accept that a larger parcel could ever, under any 
circumstance, encompass less than the entirely of a parent tract, led it to make an unsupported 
factual finding. 
Based on that holding all remaining decisions by the District Court were tainted as ifby fruit 
of the poisonous tree; Grathol's method of valuation for the take area and the severance damages 
were ignored. Put another way, had the Court not rejected Grathol' s theory of the larger parcel 
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based on an erroneous legal conclusion, the remaining findings made by the Court would have by 
necessity, been materially different. 
Because the District Court erred in concluding that Grathol's larger parcel treatment was 
precluded by Idaho law, and its findings on highest and best use are factually unsupported the 
Court's Decision and Judgment must be vacated. 
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ITS TREATMENT OF UNCONTESTED 
TESTThiONY AS TO SEVERANCE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE TAKING? 
In condemnation proceedings severance damages are recoverable by the lando\\'ner under 
Idaho Code § 7-711. In its decision, the District Court held that the testimony of Sherwood and 
Johnson as to severance damages was unpersuasive, based in part of their conclusions of the larger 
parcel as 30 acres and the absence of evidence supporting severance. It held that: 
IID' s experts Moe and Pynes both testified that the remaining 
property did not suffer any severance damages. Further, they each 
testified that they had found no basis for concluding that Grathol's 
ability to proceed with commercial development of the remainder 
was in any way impaired or damaged due to the taking for ITD's 
project. There was little, if any evidence to the contrary. 
(R, at p. 1296.) In arriving at this conclusion, the District Court failed to address ( or even mention) 
extensive testimony of Reeslund as to the increased costs for serving the westernmost remainder 
with utilities by reason of the construction of ITD's project. Reeslund testified that the costs to 
connect the newly severed parcel to the on-site wastewater system and to connect other utilities 
would exceed $1,000,000. Johnson testified that that this cost factor was included in his opinion of 
the value of the remainder after the take. The District Court appears to have simply ignored this 
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evidence. Perhaps because it came from the property owners, the District Court found it biased, but 
the District Court never even mentioned it, let alone ruled it was biased. 
More importantly, even if "owner bias" led the District Court to ignore Reeslund and 
Hughes, that does nothing to explain why ( or how) the District Court also ignored the 
uncontradicted testimony of a key witnesses called by ITD; George Hedley ("Hedley"). Hedley was 
identified as one of ITD's "rebuttal experts" whose task was to review Grathol's conceptual site 
plans and give expert opinion on potential and feasibility for development of the property. (Tr. 
3/8/12, pp. 706-07.) Hedley testified that he familiarized himself with the property and worked with 
ITD's team of expert consultants on calculating costs of development, approval process, utilities and 
feasibility. (Tr. 3/8/12, p. 707.) Hedley testified that the property was significantly impacted by the 
take because the remainder would be far more costly to develop than it was before the take. (Tr. 
3/8/12, p. 720.) Hedley testified that he looked at Grathol's "before" and "after" conceptual plans 
and came up with what it would cost to prepare the entire 56 acres (less the 16 acres taken) to make 
it ready to develop. (Tr. 3/8/12, pp. 730-3 L) 
Q. Okay. And what was your total figure for development costs for 
this Grathol before plan? 
A. The before plan turned out to be well, including the $1,450,000 
to buy the land, it was $7,102,000. So ifl deduct - it was about five 
and a half million of improvement cost, plus the price of the 
property, So you take the $1,450,000 and add the price of 
improvements, the off-site improvements, infrastructure, it came to 
$7,103,000. 
Q. And--
A. Which worked out to $4.92 a square foot. 
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(Tr. 3/8/12, pp. 734-35, 11. 16-25, 1) (emphasis added.) Then, ITD's counsel elicited testimony from 
Hedley as to what the development costs would be for the remaining property after the take: 
Q. Okay. And so after you've done that, would you look at the 
development costs, the infrastructure costs for this after plan? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was your total figure for the infrastructure costs for this 
after plan proposed by Grathol? 
A. It's about a million dollars less because the right-of-way is not 
included. You know, that land went away. So it worked out to, 
including the price of land of a $1,450,000, it came in at 
$6,592,000 ... it worked out to $6,021,000 will be the net cost to 
Grathol to improve this site on the 20 acres, which works out to 
$6.90 a square foot of developable land. So you start at $0.58, and 
really when you get done, its $6.92 is what it really costs you to own 
the land. 
(Tr. 3/8/12, p. 736, lL 2-19) (emphasis added.) On cross-examination, Hedley made it even more 
abundantly clear that in his analysis, the cost to Grathol to develop the remainder property after 
ITD's take increased by $2.00 per square foot: 
Q. So in your before development cost analysis, you came up with 
the cost that Grathol is going to have to spend is $4.92 to do this 
right? 
A. The $4.92 -
Q. per square foot? 
A. includes the price of the land. 
Q. Okay. $4.92 to do this. 
*** 
Q. Gotcha. Then you did a cost analysis of the property in the after 
condition, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And your conclusion is that it will cost $6.92 for Grathol to 
develop their property in the after condition; isn't that what you said? 
A. Well, let me back up? 
Q. Yes or no, is that what you said? 
A. I said yes. 
Q. Okay. 
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(Tr. 3/8/12, p. 745, 11. 3-23.) 
Q. So in the before condition, the cost of development is $4.92 per 
foot, that's your opinion? 
A. Per net usable acreage, yes net usable acreage. 
Q. And in the after condition, the cost to develop is $6.92, a $2 
increase in cost per foot to develop after the take; that's your 
testimony, isn't it? 
A. Based on the net available acreage left. 
(Tr. 3/8/12, p. 746, 11. 2-9.) While ITD presumably had Hedley offer this testimony to show the 
economic "infeasibility" of Grathol's development plans; ITD's own questions elicited testimony 
that the effect ofITD's take increased the cost to develop Grathol's property to the tune of $2.00 per 
square foot. The import of this evidence cannot be overstated, as Hedley was not flying solo in 
arriving at this opinion. By his own description, Hedley worked with an assembled "dream team" of 
himself, David Evans & Associates (civil engineers) and Stanley Moe (appraiser) to conduct this 
analysis.8 Thus through its own costly, expert witness analysis, ITD itself established that the 
Grathol property suffered severance damages in the amount of $2.00 per square foot by virtue of the 
increased costs to develop the net acreage left after ITD's condemnation.9 This testimony remained 
unopposed and served to illustrate, yet again that there are multiple ways to approach the valuation 
of property in condemnation. 
However, notably absent in the District Court's Decision is any discussion, reference or 
acknowledgement of Hedley's testimony. None. This was ITD's own witness whose was tasked 
with analyzing the costs of development of the Grathol project before and after ITD's take. He 
8 Hedley was paid $28,893.56. (R., pp. 1357-58.) David Evans & Associates were paid $68,174.48. (R., pp. 1358-
59.) 
9 Hedley's testimony established severance damages in the amount of $3,527,140.32 (40.486 acres @ $2.00 per 
square foot) far exceeding the severance damage valuations testified to by Grathol's witnesses. 
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performed that task, reached a conclusion, testified to the conclusion yet it is as if a tree fell in the 
forest and no one was there to hear it. The District Court simply ignores the testimony ofITD's own 
expert and yet makes the unsupported conclusion that there was no evidence of severance damages. 
Had the District Court at least acknowledged Hedley's testimony and found it unbelievable 
that would be a different story. But instead the absence of any acknowledgement, mention or 
treatment ofHedley's and Reeslund's testimony, coupled with the District Court's finding that there 
was no severance damages, leads one to the belief that either the District Court simply wasn't 
paying attention to the evidence offered at trial or had already made up its mind. 
The District Court's finding that there was no evidence to support an award of severance 
damage is utterly unsustainable. The District Court either ignored or missed ITD's own offering. 
Because the District Court totally failed to address this uncontested testimony from ITD 
demonstrating severance damages, its findings are clearly erroneous and thus unsupported. 
III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DISALLOWING TESTIMONY 
CONCERNING SYLVAN ROAD? 
At trial Johnson testified to the value of the property before and after the take. Johnson 
was asked how the proposed Sylvan Road extension impacted his opinion of value for the 
remainder. (Tr. 3/8/12, pp. 800-01, 11. 13-25, 1-7.) ITD objected, basing their objection on the 
fact that Johnson had not disclosed a separate "discrete value" for Sylvan Road. (Tr. 3/8/12, pp. 
801-802, 11. 8-25, 1-22.) 
Q. Mr. Johnson, if Sylvan Road crosses through the property by 
virtue of you as the developer building it, by virtue of the State 
building it, the highway district, regardless of how or when it 
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happens, does that impact your use of the property? That's all I'm 
asking yes or know. 
Ms. York: Same objection Your Honor. It's not part of this case. 
ITD is not alleging it as part of this case, and he doesn't have any 
claims for damages as a result of any future construction of Sylvan 
Road. 
The Court: Well, I'll let it go with just a yes or no, as afar as if the 
answers only yes or no. If he adds something else, it's going to get 
stricken. 
(Tr. 3/8/12, p. 802, 11. 12-25.) The District Court's ruling prevented Johnson from even 
mentioning how a Sylvan Road extension impacted his valuation of the remainder before and 
after condemnation. 
Prior to trial, ITD moved to dismiss any "claims" for Sylvan Road from the case. ITD 
was clearly attempting to preclude any consideration of the impacts of Sylvan Road. During that 
hearing, ITD admitted that it was improving Sylvan Road to the south of the Grathol property. 
(Tr. 2/2/12, Vol. I., p. 11, 11. 2-18.) ITD also stated that it was constructing a stub into the south 
end of the Grathol property directly across Highway 54 from Sylvan Road to the south. ITD was 
also expanding and extending Roberts Road to the north to be in alignment with Sylvan Road to 
the south. Id. The District Court even acknowledged that the extension of Sylvan Road through 
the Grathol property was all but a foregone conclusion: 
The Court: I understand that with regard to the issue of taking. But 
- and that's the law of the case. But there seems to be no dispute 
that, in order to develop the remainder - and by that I would take 
the - I'm talking about 16 from 57 here, the remainder 31 acres. 
To develop the remainder 31 acres, which would obviously be the 
highest and best use, you're not going to leave that in trees with an 
intersection like that at Athol. But at any rate the - so you're going 
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to develop it. And there seems to be no dispute that to develop it 
you would have to extend- whoever owns it, they're going to have 
to - in order to develop it, they would have to extend Sylvan Road 
across the, what I' 11 call the remainder of the 41 acres remaining. 
That's undisputed. 
(Tr. 2/2/12, Vol. I., p. 16, 11. 3-17.) Grathol presented evidence that ITD initially planned for 
Sylvan Road's extension to be part of the project and designed the alignments of Roberts Road 
(to the north) and its stub to the south to ensure that extension would occur. (R., p. 582, 587-90, 
623-32, 645.) The District Court stated that its earlier ruling eliminates a "discrete claim" for the 
taking of Sylvan Road but ITD went even further and sought to preclude any consideration of 
evidence as to the impacts of Sylvan on the remainder: 
Ms. York: And that is Grathol's new argument. 
The Court: Well I don't care whether it's new or old. But is there a 
dispute about that? Is that a factual issue? 
Ms.York: It's not a factual issue that precludes summary judgment. 
But the key to the issue is whether or not that requirement is 
caused by the taking is -
The Court: Right. 
Ms. York: --caused by the project. Because if it's not -
The Court: well, on the taking, I guess - probably you could move 
on from that because Judge Haynes has ruled what the taking is, 
the taking is 16.3 acres. I can't issue just compensation for a parcel 
being taken where there isn't a legal description and such parcel 
does not exist. So the law of the case is that there is no taking for 
Sylvan Road. That doesn't mean it's irrelevant. 
(Tr. 2/2/12, Vol. I., pp. 16-17, 11. 18-25, 1-12.) 
The Court: And you are saying well, yeah, but we are going to do 
something in the future where - because of development we are 
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going to have to build a road there and therefore we are going to 
lose that and therefore get the value for the road. Well, okay? Fine. 
But then you know ... does the road benefit? I mean, who 
developing that property- who owning that property isn't going to 
run that road through? There isn't anybody in God's green earth 
who is going to hold that property and not run the road through, 
whether they are required to do so or not. So to call that a damage 
just flat out doesn't make sense. 
Mr. Marfice: Our position, Judge, and our evidence is going to be 
that but-for the portion of the property being taken and the 
construction of the project there would never be a requirement that 
Sylvan Road be extended through the property. I don't think that's 
the same thing as saying it's a taking. I respectfully disagree with 
you on that. 
(Tr. 2/2/12, Vol. IL, pp. 9-10, 11. 8-25, 1.) 
Grathol contends that were it not for ITD's project, there would never be any requirement 
to construct Sylvan Road to provide access through the property. (Tr. 2/2/12, Vol. I., Vol. I., pp. 
19-21.) The District Court's recognized that testimony of Sylvan Road's impacts on the 
remainder would be relevant to determining value (as severance) but the District Court 
completely misconstrued what the evidence would show at trial and once the trial occurred the 
District Court completely ignored what the evidence did show. At the summary judgment 
hearing on February 2, 2012: 
The Court: They can work with the fair market value and the 
severance damages before and after to the remainder. But they're 
going to have to show me a case - and I dare them to find it - that 
shows that there's going to be an award for constructing - the cost 
of constructing Grathol [sicl Road across the - you know, it may 
cut into the - it may very well be relevant to the before and after 
analysis, but as a damage claim, I don't see it. I don't even 
understand that that's what they're making. 
-44-
(Tr. 2/2/12, Vol. I., p. 21, 11. 11-20) ( emphasis added.) Evidence presented at trial from witness 
testimony went to what impacts the take would have on the remainder. (Tr. 2/2/12, Vol. I., p. 73-
74, 11. 21-25, 1-2.) The District Court recognized that there was no discrete "claim" for the 
Sylvan Road construction and therefore dismissed at ITD's urging a "claim" which had never 
been made. (Tr. 2/2/12, Vol. IL, p. 31, 11. 5-13.) 
The evidence at trial was not to present a discrete claim for the "dirt value" of Sylvan 
Road nor for the cost to construct Sylvan Road. However, the District Court's evidentiary ruling 
at trial prevented Johnson from even describing how a future frontage road would impact the 
development plans for the property and how that issue supported Johnson's valuation. Had he 
been permitted to testify to this relevant issue, Johnson would have described how the extension 
of that road impacted the highest and best use and, in turn, the value of the remainder. 
The District Court committed error in preventing Johnson from giving testimony 
supporting his valuation, when such testimony was only as to the impacts of the Sylvan Road 
extension across Grathol's property. Evidence of impacts on the market value of the remainder 
resulting from the condemnor's acquisition and its construction of a proposed improvement is 
admissible to determine severance damage. LC. § 7-711(2)(a). The District Court precluded such 
admissible evidence by expanding the summary judgment ruling to prevent any discussion of 
Sylvan Road. That ruling affected the substantial rights of Grathol in presenting relevant 
evidence of value and just compensation owed. In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the 
District Court found Johnson's severance damage conclusions unpersuasive and unsupported. 
(R., pp. 1293, 1295.) But the conclusions were only unsupported because of the District Court's 
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own erroneous limitation on the evidence intended to support the conclusions. Because 
Johnson's testimony was admissible to support his opinion of severance damages, the District 
Court committed error in preventing such testimony. 
IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR A \V ARD ING COSTS AND DISCRETIONARY 
COSTS TO ITD? 
Following the District Court's decision, ITD moved for an award of costs and attorneys 
fees citing I.R.C.P. 54 and Idaho Code § 12-121 and "Idaho case law." (R., pp. 1316, 1321.) 
Grathol objected to the request on the basis that ITD failed to request fees and costs under LC. § 
12-117 ( exclusive basis) and that Idaho case law did not support an award of fees or costs to a 
condemnor. (R. pp. 1482-1502.) Grathol also objected to ITD's claimed discretionary costs on 
the basis that ITD presented no proof that such costs were either necessary or exceptional under 
the I.R.C.P 54(d)(l)(D) standard. (R., p. 1504.) On August 29, 2012, the District Court 
announced its ruling on the record. (Tr. 8/29/12.) The District Court held that LC.§ 12-117 
acted as guidance for a consideration of an award of attorney fees under LC. § 7-718. The 
District Court applied that standard and denied ITD's request for fees. (Tr. 8/29/12, pp. 49-50.) 
ITD has cross-appealed the District Court's denial of fees. 
The District Court, however, then departed from Section 12-117 as giving guidance in 
finding that ITD was the prevailing party and entitled to costs as a matter of right and (some) 
discretionary costs. The District Court found ITD to be a prevailing party for costs under LR.C.P. 
54 when applying the Acarrequi factors 10 without a regard to the standards in LC. § 12-117 used 
10 Ada County Highway Dist. By and Through Fairbanks v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983). 
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in denying fees. The Court stated ITD prevailed because the ultimate award of just compensation 
was less than ITD's December 15, 2011 offer of settlement to Grathol. The District Court held 
that Idaho case law supported an award of costs to the condemner under this analysis. 
Idaho courts have long held that in eminent domain a condemner is required to pay all 
costs of the proceeding. Portneuf-Marsh Valley Irr. Co. v. Portneuf Irrigating Co., 19 Idaho 483, 
114 P.19 (1911); Rmvson-Works Lumber Co. v. Richardson, 26 Idaho 37, 141 P.74 (1914); 
Bassett v. Swenson, 51 Idaho 256, 5 P.2d 722 (1931). Indeed in State ex rel. McKelvey v. Styner, 
57 Idaho 144, 63 P.2d 152 (1936), the Idaho Supreme Court held that costs should be awarded to 
condemnees regardless of the result. Id. at 154, 63 P.2d 152. Such was Idaho's jurisprudence 
until 1983 and Acarrequi. 
In Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983), this Court considered the appeal of 
the trial court's automatic award of fees and costs to the landowner in a condemnation 
proceeding. In that case the landowner moved for costs/fees under LC. § 12-121 and LR.C.P. 
54(e)(5). This Court rejected the District Court's automatic award of attorney's fees and created 
a new standard governing the award of attorney's fees to condemnees. The Acarrequi court 
acknowledged that Idaho precedent interpreting LC. § 7-718 required the condemner to pay all 
costs. Id. at 876, 673 P .2d 1070. The Acarrequi court however adopted a new standard for fees: 
We now hold that an award of reasonable attorneys' fees to the 
condemnee in an eminent domain proceeding is a matter for the 
trial court's guided discretion and, as in other areas of law, such 
award will be overturned only upon a showing of abuse. We 
further hold that the condemnee's costs may be awarded under 
LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C) of 54(d). 
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Id (emphasis added.) The Acarrequi court remanded the matter to the trial court to consider 
whether the condemnees "prevailed" under the new standard. Id. at 878, 673 P.2d 1072. In doing 
so, the Acarrequi court stated that "[ e ]xcept in the most extreme and unlikely situation, we 
cannot envision an award of attorneys' fees and costs to a condemnor." Id. The Acarrequi court 
did not provide any further analysis or explanation of what an "extreme and unlikely situation" 
would be, nor did it address the constitutionality of an award of fees or costs to a condemnor. 
In State ex rel. Ohman v. Ivan Talbot Family Trust, 120 Idaho 825,820 P.2d 695 (1991), 
the Idaho Supreme Court extended Acarrequi to include an application of LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) 
standards to the prevailing party analysis. In Talbot the trial court had found that the landowners 
were not the prevailing party, but made a finding that the condemnor was the prevailing party, 
for purposes of assessing fees or costs. Id. at 829, 820 P.2d 699. Talbot did not discuss the 
application of such factors to a condemnor nor did it extend Acarrequi to give condemnors a fee 
claim if they lost less at trial than they offered to settle pre-trial Id. In State ex rel. Smith v. 
Jardine, 130 Idaho 318, 940 P.2d 1137 (1997), this Court clarified Talbot to point out that "to 
the extent the provisions of LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) are not in conflict with the Acarrequi factors 
[including a timely offer], the trial court must consider the provisions of I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B)." 
Id. at 321, 940 P.2d 1140. But, Jardine went no further than that. It certainly didn't create a right 
to fees by the condemnor. 
In a departure from these cases, the District Court here applied the Acarrequi factors to 
find that ITD was the prevailing party for an award of costs and discretionary costs. In doing so, 
the District Court seized upon the dicta in Acarrequi, turned it around and ruled that costs could 
-48-
be awarded to the condemnor. Grathol is unable to find any case, in any jurisdiction, awarding 
costs ( or fees) to a condemnor. Indeed, an award like this would be unconstitutional under Article 
I, Section 14 of Idaho's Constitution as well as under the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution guaranteeing just compensation for the property taken. It would deprive a landowner of 
her constitutional just compensation for the taking by reducing or potentially eliminating the 
landowner's award merely because the landowner put the government to its proof at trial. While 
Idaho cases have moved away from the historical norm of automatically awarding a condemnee 
costs and fees, there is simply no authority for the proposition that a condemnor should be 
awarded fees and costs simply because the just compensation awarded was less than what was 
offered pre-trial. Such a holding would not only reduce the actual just compensation owed for the 
taking as found by the court or jury, but could result in the perverse outcome of a landowner 
ultimately being required to pay the condemnor more than the landowner's constitutional just 
compensation. The mere notion of such a result is abhorrent. 
The District Court ruled that ITD's (December 15, 2011) pre-trial offer of settlement was 
timely under Acarrequi and therefore ITD was a prevailing party because the Court awarded 
Grathol less than that offer. As the prevailing party, the District Court reasoned, ITD could seek 
costs. While the District Court treated LC. § 12-117 as a limitation on an award of fees, it 
departed from applying 12 -11 7 with respect to costs. Instead of finding under I. C. § 12-117 that 
the non-prevailing party must have acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, it simply 
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applied the Acarrequi factors and I.R.C.P. 54 against Grathol. 11 The District Court's decision 
ignores long-standing jurisprudence that in condemnation cases, the costs are borne by the 
condemnor (Portneuf-Marsh Valley Irr. Co. v. Portneuf Irrigating Co., 19 Idaho 483, 114 P.19 
(1911); Rawson-Works Lumber Co. v. Richardson, 26 Idaho 37, 141 P.74 (1914); Bassett v. 
Swenson, 51 Idaho 256, 5 P.2d 722 (1931)), but may be awarded to the condemnee upon an 
application of the Acarrequi factors. While the District Court made a factual finding that ITD' s 
offer was timely it committed reversible error in construing such factors against the condemnee 
for an award of costs. 
The District Court additionally erred when it awarded ITD discretionary costs of $11,000 
for ITD's second appraisal expert (Pynes) because the District Court found that his testimony 
and report was "helpful" in determining a value. (Tr. 8/29/12, pp. 56-57, 11. 24-25, 1-9.) 
I.R.C.P 54(d)(l)(D) provides that additional costs "may be allowed upon a showing that 
said costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred." A trial court must make 
express findings as to why such specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be 
allowed. Westfall v. Caterpillar, Inc., 120 Idaho 918, 821 P.2d 973 (1991) (costs under this rule 
must be shown to be both necessary and exceptional, therefore the trial court manifestly abused 
its discretion by applying the incorrect standard.); Bingham v. Montane Resources Assocs. 133 
Idaho 420, 987 P.2d 1035 (1999), (trial court's failure to make express findings that the costs 
11 Indeed in, City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 589, 130 P.3d 1118, 1127 (2006) the Idaho Supreme Court 
considered arguments that LC. § 12-117 could act as a limitation to an award of discretionary costs in a 
condemnation proceeding for the condemnee. This Court found that the City presented valid legal arguments and 
therefore the 12-117 standard was not met. 
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were exceptional, necessary, reasonably incurred and should in the interests of justice be 
assessed against the adverse party, required reversal); Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 
256 P.3d 755, 2011 WL 2673399 (2011). 
Here, the District Court made no determination why $11,000 of Pynes' appraisal fees was 
either necessary or exceptions; only that his appraisal report was helpful. Expert appraisal 
testimony is routine in condemnation actions and the fact that ITD hired a second appraiser did 
render it an "exceptional" cost. The District Court likewise did not provide any meaningful 
reasoning for the award of this discretionary cost other than to criticize both Sherwood and 
Moe's appraisal reports. Because the District Court failed to make an express finding that the 
expert fees of Pynes awarded to ITD were necessary or exceptional, the award must be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Grathol respectfully requests this Court vacate the judgment of 
the trial court and remand the case for a new trial. Grathol requests costs on appeal pursuant to 
LA.R40(a). 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of January, 2013. 
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